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A scheme is proposed by which two parties, Alice and Bob, can securely exchange real numbers.
The scheme requires Alice and Bob to share entanglement and both to perform Bell-state measure-
ments. With a qubit system two real numbers can each be sent by Alice and Bob, resulting in
four real numbers shared by them. The number of real numbers that can be shared increases if
higher-dimensional systems are utilized. The number of significant figures of each shared real num-
ber depends upon the number of Bell-state measurements that Alice and Bob perform. The security
of the scheme against individual eavesdropping attacks is analyzed and the effects of channel losses
and errors discussed.
Since the introduction by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 of the first complete protocol(BB84) for quantum
key distribution[1], many proposals for its variations, im-
provements and modifications have appeared and their
experimental implementations have been developed[2].
The security of the BB84 protocol and its variations
rely upon the quantum-mechanical principle that infor-
mation gain in an attempt to distinguish between two
non-orthogonal quantum states introduces a detectable
disturbance in the state of the system. The sender, Al-
ice, sends the signal to the receiver, Bob, in states chosen
randomly from two conjugate bases. The eavesdropper,
Eve, cannot guess the basis right every time, and her at-
tempt to measure the signal in the wrong basis inevitably
introduces an error to the key transmission.
An interesting alternative to the BB84 protocol is the
scheme based on entangled pairs first proposed by Ek-
ert in 1991(E91)[3]. In its original version with spin
(polarization)-entangled particles, Alice and Bob per-
form spin measurements along one of three directions.
The measurement direction is chosen randomly and in-
dependently of each other. Measurement outcomes ob-
tained when they measure along the same direction can
be used for key generation, while those obtained when
they measure along different directions are used to test
Bell’s inequality. The security of the E91 protocol de-
pends upon the fact that eavesdropping reduces the de-
gree of correlation between the two members of the en-
tangled pair and that this reduction manifests itself as a
reduction in the degree of violation of Bell’s inequality.
In this work we propose a scheme which allows two par-
ties, Alice and Bob, to simultaneously and securely ex-
change real numbers. As in the E91 protocol, the scheme
requires Alice and Bob to share entanglement. Instead
of performing measurements along randomly chosen di-
rections, however, Alice and Bob are required to perform
Bell-state measurements. The security of the scheme re-
lies upon the fact that eavesdropping changes the out-
come of the Bell-state measurements. This change in the
outcome of the Bell-state measurements originates from
the reduction in the degree of correlation between the two
members of the entangled pair caused by eavesdropping.
In this respect, the proposed scheme may be considered
as a variation of the E91 protocol. The scheme, how-
ever, involves no random choice of bases or directions.
With a qubit system, Alice and Bob each can send two
real numbers to each other, resulting in four real num-
bers shared by them. The number of significant figures
of each shared real number is determined by the number
of Bell-state measurements that Alice and Bob perform.
The protocol may thus be considered as a scheme to al-
low Alice and Bob to securely share integers (or collection
of digits) whose length is determined by the number of
Bell-state measurements they perform. The digits they
share can be used for key generation for cryptographic
purposes.
Let us suppose that Alice has an EPR(Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen) source that emits a large number
N(≫1) of entangled pairs one by one at a regular time
interval, each pair in the same Bell state. The Bell state
can be any of the four Bell states
|Φ00〉AB =
∣∣Φ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B) (1a)
|Φ01〉AB =
∣∣Φ−〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B − |1〉A |1〉B) (1b)
|Φ10〉AB =
∣∣Ψ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B + |1〉A |0〉B) (1c)
|Φ11〉AB =
∣∣Ψ−〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B − |1〉A |0〉B) (1d)
but for the sake of the concreteness of argument, we take
it as |Φ00〉AB . Alice keeps the qubit A of each pair and
sends the qubit B to Bob.
Alice has in her possession another set of N qubits,
which we denote by the subscript α, each of which she
prepared in the state |ψ〉α = a|0〉α + b|1〉α (|a|2 + |b|2 =
1). Since Alice prepared the qubits α in this state, she
and only she knows what a and b are, and she keeps
them to herself. Alice performs a series of N Bell-state
measurements on each pair of qubits α and A. On the
other side, Bob has in his possession yet another set of
N qubits, which we denote by the subscript β, each of
which he prepared in the state |ψ〉β = x|0〉β+y|1〉β (|x|2+
|y|2 = 1). Since Bob prepared the qubits β in this state,
he and only he knows what x and y are, and he keeps
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FIG. 1: Experimental Scheme. The EPR(Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen) source emits entangled pairs in state |Φ00〉AB . Alice
performs Bell-state measurements on the qubit pairs α and
A, and Bob on the qubit pairs β and B. BSM stands for Bell-
state measurement.
them to himself. Bob also performs a series of N Bell-
state measurements on each pair of qubits β and B. The
experimental scheme is depicted schematically in Fig. 1.
In order to find the probability Pijkl that Alice’s
Bell-state measurement yields |Φij〉αA and Bob’s Bell-
state measurement yields |Φkl〉βB, we expand the total
wave function |ψ〉αβAB = |ψ〉α|ψ〉β |Φ00〉AB in terms of
|Φij〉αA|Φkl〉βB as
|ψ〉αβAB =
1∑
i,j,k,l=0
|Φij〉αA |Φkl〉βB Vijkl . (2)
A straight forward algebra yields
V0000 = V0101 = V1010 = V1111 =
1
2
√
2
(xa+ yb) (3a)
V0001 = V0100 = V1011 = V1110 =
1
2
√
2
(xa− yb)(3b)
V0010 = −V0111 = V1000 = −V1101 = 1
2
√
2
(xb + ya) (3c)
V0011 = −V0110 = V1001 = −V1100 = 1
2
√
2
(xb− ya)(3d)
The probabilities Pijkl ’s are given by Pijkl = |Vijkl |2.
Alice and Bob can determine these probabilities exper-
imentally from the result of their Bell-state measure-
ments. They only need to count the number Nijkl of
occurrences for the joint outcome |Φij〉αA|Φkl〉βB. The
experimentally determined probabilities are then given
by
P expijkl =
Nijkl
N
(4)
Suppose now, however, that Alice and Bob each an-
nounce publicly her or his measurement result only when
the outcome is Φ10 or Φ11. This is consistent with the
realistic situation, because only these two Bell states
can be unambiguously distinguished with linear optical
means[4]. The probabilities that can be determined ex-
perimentally are then only P exp1010, P
exp
1011, P
exp
1110, and P
exp
1111.
These probabilities are given theoretically as
P1010 = P1111 =
1
8
|xa+ yb|2 = 1
8
[cos2 θa cos
2 θb + sin
2 θa sin
2 θb + 2 cos θa cos θb sin θa sin θb cos (φa + φb)] (5a)
P1011 = P1110 =
1
8
|xa− yb|2 = 1
8
[cos2 θa cos
2 θb + sin
2 θa sin
2 θb − 2 cos θa cos θb sin θa sin θb cos (φa + φb)] (5b)
where we set
a = cos θa, b = sin θae
iφa
x = cos θb, y = sin θbe
iφb (6)
When the experimentally determined probabilities are
substituted for the corresponding theoretical probabili-
ties, Eqs. (5) constitute two equations that relate the
four constants θa, φa, θb and φb. Since Alice knows θa and
φa, she can use the two equations to solve for θb and φb.
Similarly, Bob knows θb and φb, and therefor he can use
the two equations to solve for θa and φa. A third person,
an eavesdropper, however, knows none of the four con-
stants, and there is no way for her to determine the four
unknown constants from the two equations. Thus, the
method described above, with Alice and Bob announc-
ing her or his measurement result only when the outcome
is Φ10 or Φ11, provides a means for Alice and Bob to se-
curely share four real numbers. Without loss of generality
we take them as cos θa, cosφa, cos θb and cosφb, four real
numbers less than 1.
The number of real numbers that can be shared in-
creases if Alice and Bob use higher-dimensional systems.
The generalized Bell states for a d-dimensional system
qudit) can be defined as [5]
|Φjl〉AB = 1√
d
d−1∑
q=0
ωlq|q〉|q + j〉 (7)
where ω = ei
2pi
d . As before, we assume that each of the
entangled pairs AB produced by the source is in |Φ00〉AB.
Alice performs a series of Bell-state measurements on
each pair of the qudit A and another qudit α she pre-
pared in the state
d−1∑
i=0
ai|i〉α, while Bob performs a series
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FIG. 2: Eve’s intercept-resend attack
of Bell-state measurements on each pair of the qudit B
and another qudit β he prepared in the state
d−1∑
i=0
xi|i〉β.
As in the qubit case, the total wave function |ψ〉αβAB can
be expanded in terms of the Bell states |Φij〉αA|Φkl〉βB,
and the probability amplitudes Vijkl ’s can be expressed
in terms of ai’s and xi’s. we obtain
Vijkl =
1
d
√
d
ωij+kl
d−1∑
m=0
ω−(j+l)mam−j xm−k (8)
where all indices are evaluated modulo d. The probabil-
ities Pijkl ’s are then determined by Pijkl = |Vijkl |2.
The constants ai’s and xi’s constitute (4d-4) unknowns
to be determined from experimentally determined prob-
abilities P expijkl ’s. To Alice and Bob, however, there are
only (2d-2) unknowns. By agreeing to publicly announce
the measurement result only when the measurement out-
come is among judiciously chosen Bell states, Alice and
Bob can limit the number of probabilities that can be de-
termined experimentally in such a way that the number
of equations that relate the experimentally determined
probabilities with the parameters ai’s and xi’s is greater
than or equal to (2d-2) but less than (4d-4). This way,
(4d-4) real numbers can be secretely shared between Al-
ice and Bob.
We now discuss the security of the scheme described
above against eavesdropping attacks. Perhaps the sim-
plest attack that Eve can attempt is the intercept-resend
attack depicted in Figure 2. In this attack Eve intercepts
each qubit B being transmitted from Alice to Bob and
keeps it, while she generates her own entangled pairs EF
in the Bell state |Φ00〉EF , keeps the qubits E herself and
sends the other qubits F to Bob. In addition to qubits
B and E, Eve has two sets of qubits γ and δ, which she
prepares in states, say, x′|0〉γ + y′|0〉γ and a′|0〉δ + b′|1〉δ,
respectively. Eve performs her own Bell-state measure-
ments on the pairs γ and B and separately on the pairs
δ and E. By looking at correlations of the outcomes of
her γ-B measurement and Alice’s α-A measurement, Eve
can determine a and b, i.e., cos θa and cosφa. Similarly,
from correlations of the outcomes of her δ-E measure-
ment and Bob’s β-F measurement, she can determine x
and y, i.e., cos θb and cosφb, too. On the other side, Al-
ice and Bob would have performed their Bell-state mea-
surements on the pairs αA and βF , respectively. Note,
however, that the qubits A and F are not entangled, and
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FIG. 3: Eve’s entangle-measure attack
thus Alice’s Bell-state measurement is completely inde-
pendent of Bob’s Bell-state measurement. As a result,
all the probabilities Pijkl ’s should be the same, i.e.,
Pijkl =
1
16
, i, j, k, l = 0 or 1
Alice and Bob can check if P1010 or P1111 is the same
as (or close to) P1011 or P1110. If they feel that the two
probabilities are too close to trust, they discard the data
and restart from the beginning. It is possible that the
two probabilities are the same (or close) not because of
Eve’s attack but because Alice and Bob happen to choose
φa and φb such that cos(φa+φb) ≃ 0. This case will also
have to be discarded. If Eve attacks not all but only a
part of the qubits B, the two probabilities may not be suf-
ficiently close to be detected. In this case Alice and Bob
must resort to digit comparison to detect Eve’s attack.
Due to the attack, the real numbers cos θa and cosφa
(cos θb and cosφb) computed by Bob(Alice) from the ex-
perimentally determined probabilities will deviate from
the correct values that Alice (Bob) initially assigned. By
comparing a few digits (e.g., a digit at the third decimal
point of cosθa) and checking if they agree, Alice and Bob
can check against Eve’s attacks.
Another possible mode of attack is the “entangle-
measure” attack depicted in Fig. 3. In this attack Eve
prepares a set of ancilla qubits E each in state |0〉E ,
entangle each of them with the qubit B by perform-
ing a CNOT operation with the qubit B as the con-
trol bit and the qubit E as the target bit, and performs
a Bell-state measurement upon each pair of the qubit
E and another qubit η a set of which she prepares in
state, say, u|0〉η + v|0〉η. In this mode of attack, Eve’s
role is indistinguishable from Bob’s role, and she can
obtain as much information as Bob can. In order to
find the effect of the entangle-measure attack upon the
probabilities Pijkl ’s, we expand the six-qubit wave func-
tion |ψ〉αβηABE = (a|0〉α + b|1〉α)(x|0〉β + y|1〉β)(u|0〉η +
v|1〉η) 1√2 (|0〉A |0〉B |0〉E + |1〉A |1〉B |1〉E) in terms of the
product of the Bell states as
|ψ〉αβηABE =
1∑
i,j,k,l,m,n=0
|Φij〉αA |Φkl〉βB |Φmn〉ηE Vijklmn
(9)
and calculate the probabilities according to Pijkl =
41∑
m,n=0
|Vijklmn |2. A straightforward algebra yields
P0000 = P0101 = P1010 = P1111 =
P0001 = P0100 = P1011 = P1110 =
1
8
(
|xa|2 + |yb|2
)
(10a)
P0010 = P0111 = P1000 = P1101 =
P0011 = P0110 = P1001 = P1100 =
1
8
(
|xb|2 + |ya|2
)
(10b)
In particular, the probabilities P1010, P1111, P1011, and
P1110 are all the same in this case and given by
P1010 = P1111 = P1011 = P1110 =
1
8
(
|xa|2 + |yb|2
)
= 18
(
cos2 θa cos
2 θb + sin
2 θa sin
2 θb
)
(11)
The entangle-measure attack can thus be detected us-
ing the same method employed to detect the intercept-
resend attack. If Eve entangles every qubit B with her
ancilla qubit E, it can be detected by checking if P1010
or P1111 is the same as (or close to) P1011 or P1110. In
general, however, Alice and Bob should perform digit
comparison to detect the attack, because Eve can attack
only a part of the qubits B.
Let us turn our attention to practical issues con-
cerning the proposed scheme. Suppose Alice and Bob
want to securely share 4 real numbers less than 1
(cos θa, cosφa, cos θb, cosφb) each accurate to D decimal
points, or equivalently 4 integers each of length D, or
equivalently 4D digits. How many times do Alice and
Bob each need to perform Bell-state measurements?
When a sufficiently large number N≫1 of Bell-state mea-
surements are made, the number Nexpijkl of times the joint
outcome |Φij〉αA|Φkl〉βB is counted lies within the range
defined as[6]
NPijkl −
√
2NPijkl (1− Pijkl) . Nexpijkl . NPijkl +
√
2NPijkl (1− Pijkl) (12)
where Pijkl is the exact theoretical probability given,
for example, for a qubit system by the absolute square
of Vijkl given by Eqs. (5). Thus, the experimen-
tally determined probabilities P expijkl = N
exp
ijkl/N are ac-
curate to ∼
√
2NPijkl(1−Pijkl)
N
<∼
1√
N
. Taking N = 10n,
P expijkl ’s are accurate to
n
2 decimal points. The real values
cos θa, cosφa, cos θb, and cosφb that are determined from
these experimentally determined probabilities should also
be accurate to D = n2 decimal points. We conclude
therefore that, for Alice and Bob to securely share 4D
digits, they should perform ∼ 102D Bell-state measure-
ments each. The proposed scheme has therefore a rather
low efficiency of ∼ 4D10−2D.
The efficiency of the scheme can be enhanced by not-
ing that the efficiency decreases exponentially with D.
Instead of trying to obtain 4D digits in a single experi-
ment consisting of ∼ 102D measurements, Alice and Bob
can opt to divide it into many independent experiments
each with different values of parameters a, b, x and y.
For example, consider the situation where Alice and Bob
want to share 400 digits. They can achieve it by per-
forming ∼ 10200 Bell-state measurements in a single ex-
periment and obtaining 4 real numbers accurate to 100
decimal points, i.e., 400 digits. Alternatively, they can
choose to shoot for only four digits in a single experi-
ment by performing ∼ 102 Bell-state measurements and
obtaining 4 real numbers accurate only to one decimal
point. They can then repeat the experiment 100 times,
each time with different values of a, b, x and y to obtain
400 real numbers each accurate to one decimal point, i.e.,
400 digits. Using this “divide-repeat” strategy, the num-
ber of Bell-state measurements performed by Alice and
Bob is reduced to ∼ 104 and the efficiency is enhanced
to ∼ 400/104 = 4 × 10−2. Even if some (two or three)
of these four digits obtained from each single experiment
need to be used for checking against eavesdropping at-
tacks, the efficiency still remains to be ∼ 10−2. If Alice
and Bob feel that they need more digits than two or three
from each single experiment to be used for the security
check, they can make ∼ 104 Bell-state measurements and
obtain eight digits in a single experiment. They can then
repeat the experiment 50 times to obtain 400 digits al-
together. The efficiency in this case is ∼ 1.6 × 10−5.
Another way of increasing the efficiency is to use high-
dimensional systems. Since the number of real numbers
that can be shared increases with increased dimension,
the efficiency also increases by going to high-dimensional
systems.
Up to now we have assumed an ideal situation where
there are no losses and no errors. In general, however,
losses and errors are unavoidable and their effects must
be taken into account. Due to losses, only Nη qubits
out of N qubits sent from Alice will be detected by Bob,
where η is the probability that a single photon sent form
Alice is detected at Bob’s detectors. If one considers only
the channel losses, it is given by η = 10−(αl+c)/10, where
α is the absorption coefficient, l is the length of the chan-
nel(fiber) and c accounts for a distance-independent loss
in the channel. The probabilities P expijkl ’s should then be
determined by comparing the number Nexpijkl’s not to N
but to Nη. A more accurate determination of the prob-
abilities can be obtained if one lets Bob announce his
measurement result every time he receives a qubit B. He
5should announce whether the outcome of his Bell-state
measurement is Φ10 or Φ11 or inconclusive (correspond-
ing to the case where the outcome is either Φ00 or Φ01
but he cannot distinguish between the two). The num-
ber Nexpijkl can then simply be normalized to the number
of times Bob has made his announcement.
Errors can occur during generation, transmission and
detection of qubits and can seriously limit the perfor-
mance of our proposed scheme. Under ideal errorless con-
ditions, the number of digits that Alice and Bob share can
be increased simply by increasing the number of qubits
they prepare and the number of measurements they per-
form. When errors are present, however, the error rate
limits the number of meaningful digits that Alice and
Bob share through a single experiment, and it may be
meaningless to increase the number of measurements to
be made in a single experiment beyond a certain level.
For example, suppose the error rate is 5%. The accu-
racy of the probabilities P expijkl ’s determined from the ex-
periment cannot be better than 5%, which means that
even the digit at the second decimal point of the real
numbers cos θa, cosφa, cos θb and cosφb determined from
these probabilities is not guaranteed to be accurate. It
is then best for Alice and Bob to shoot for four digits,
one digit for each real number, in a single experiment.
The number of measurements that can guarantee the ac-
curacy of the digit at the first decimal point is ∼ 102
and it is in this case meaningless to increase the number
of measurements well beyond ∼ 102 in one experiment.
When more digits are desired to be shared, Alice and
Bob need to repeat the process of ∼ 102 measurements
with different sets of parameters a, b, x and y. Thus, the
“divide-repeat” strategy is not only desirable to enhance
the efficiency but also required to make the scheme work
in the presence of errors.
We are now in a position to propose a protocol for
quantum number distribution which allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to share securely a certain number of
digits. Alice and Bob should proceed as follows.
(1) Alice prepares N entangled pairs AB, each in state
|Φ00〉AB, keeps the qubit A and sends the qubit
B to Bob. Alice has another set of Nη qubits α
and divides them into Nη/100 groups with each
group consisting of 100 qubits. (We assume for
simplicity that Nη is an integral multiple of 100.)
She prepares the qubits in the jth group (j=1, 2,
..., Nη/100) in state (aj |0〉α + bj |1〉α). Bob has a
set of Nη qubits β and divides them into Nη/100
groups with each group consisting of 100 qubits.
He prepares the qubits in the jth group in state
(xj |0〉β + yj |1〉β).
(2) Bob takes the first 100 qubits B he receives and the
100 qubits in the first group of the qubits β. He per-
forms a Bell-state measurement on each qubit pair
βB and announces publicly where the outcome of
each measurement is Φ10 or Φ11 or inconclusive.
Alice takes the 100 qubits A, entangled partners of
the first 100 qubits B that Bob received, and the
100 qubits in the first group of qubits α. She per-
forms a Bell-state measurement on each qubit pair
αA and announces publicly whether the outcome
of each measurement is Φ10 or Φ11.
(3) Alice and Bob count the numbers Nexp1010,
Nexp1111, N
exp
1011, and N
exp
1110 of joint occurrences of
|Φ10〉αA|Φ10〉βB, |Φ11〉αA|Φ11〉βB, |Φ10〉αA|Φ11〉βB,
and |Φ11〉αA|Φ10〉βB, and determine the corre-
sponding probabilities P expijkl = N
exp
ijkl/100. From the
probabilities, they determine cosθa, cosφa, cosθb
and cosφb, each to the first decimal point. They
now share 4 digits.
(4) As a check for the accuracy of the experiment, Al-
ice and Bob check if P exp1010 and P
exp
1111 agree at least
to the first decimal point. If not, they discard the
data and restart. They do the same checking for
P exp1011 and P
exp
1110. As a check against eavesdropping
attacks, they check if P exp1010 (or P
exp
1111) is sufficiently
different from P exp1011 (or P
exp
1110). If not, they discard
the data and restart.
As a further check against eavesdropping attacks,
Alice and Bob each take two of the four digits they
share ( they could take one or three digits depend-
ing upon the level of confidence) and publicly com-
pare and check if each of the two pairs agree. If
the agreement is found, then they each keep the re-
maining two digits as the key. If not, they discard
the data and restart.
(5) The steps (2)-(4) are repeated Nη100 times, each time
with a different set of 100 qubits each of A, B, α and
β. When all measurements are completed success-
fully, Alice and Bob have collected between them
2× Nη100 real numbers each accurate to the first dec-
imal point, i.e., 2 × Nη100 digits. The 2 × Nη100 digits
constitute the final key.
We note that if the error rate is below 1%, Alice and
Bob can shoot for 8 digits instead of 4 digits in a single ex-
periment, by dividing the qubits into groups of 104 qubits
instead of 100 qubits, and performing ∼ 104 Bell-state
measurements instead of 100 measurements in a single
experiment. Each single experiment will then produce 4
real numbers accurate to the second decimal point, i.e.,
eight digits. This way Alice and Bob have more qubits
available for digit comparison, but the efficiency will be
lower.
In conclusion we have proposed a protocol based on en-
tanglement and Bell-state measurements that allows two
parties to exchange real numbers securely. As compared
with the standard quantum cryptographic protocols such
as BB84, our proposed protocol suffers from the low ef-
ficiency. With the help of the “divide-repeat” strategy,
however, its efficiency can be increased to ∼ 10−2. As
the security of the proposed protocol relies upon the fact
that an act of eavesdropping changes the outcome of the
6Bell-state measurements, the protocol requires the pro-
cess of digit comparison to protect against eavesdropping
attacks. The protocol, however, does not require random
choice between two conjugate bases as in BB84 nor the
Bell’s inequality test as in E91. The proposed proto-
col appears to protect itself well against eavesdropping
attacks. It is secure, in particular, against an individ-
ual attack in which Eve attacks every qubit transmitted
from Alice to Bob, because such an all-out attack leaves
its mark on the probabilities. If Eve attacks only a part
of the qubits, then Alice and Bob have to perform infor-
mation reconciliation, which consists of checking if some
randomly selected digits they share agree. Ironically, the
low efficiency of the protocol works to help this digit com-
parison process effective. Because of the low efficiency,
the information on whether there were eavesdropping at-
tacks is contained in a relatively small number of digits
produced by the protocol. The agreement between just
a small number of pairs of digits can thus be considered
as a strong indication for the absence of eavesdropping
attacks.
We note that our proposed protocol provides a way of
two-way communication, allowing simultaneous mutual
exchange of information between Alice and Bob. Alice
and Bob are simultaneously both the sender and the re-
ceiver of information, while in standard cryptographic
protocols information usually flows one way.
On the practical side, a successful operation of the pro-
posed protocol requires generation, distribution, and de-
tection of entanglement at a single-photon level, a diffi-
cult but not an impossible task. It requires, in partic-
ular, a large number of Bell-state measurements to be
performed. We emphasize, however, that only two of the
four Bell states are required to be distinguished. The
distinction of the two Bell states is possible using only
linear optical means and therefore can be accomplished
without too much difficulty with the present technology.
Channel errors must be minimized for a successful op-
eration of the protocol. If our protocol is to work at all,
the error rate must be kept below ∼ 10%, because the
error rate of over ∼ 10% will not guarantee the accuracy
of the digit even at the first decimal point.
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